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SOCIAL HARM 
Some scholars – notably in and around what is known as ‘critical criminology’ – have argued 
that a disciplinary approach organised around a concept of ‘social harm’ may be more 
theoretically coherent and more progressive politically than a discipline organised around 
the state-defined notion of crime. An early statement of this approach, drawing on sporadic, 
but longer term work in and around criminology, can be found in Hillyard et al, (2004). 
Herein a social harm approach was considered in theoretical and methodological terms, and 
applied to a broad range of areas of social life, from migration to murder, to violence and 
victimisation.  
Several clusters of rationales were set out to establish a social harm approach as distinct 
from criminology. Crime, it was argued, has no ontological reality, but is a category which 
has to be constructed through law’s complex (and often incoherent) reasonings, and 
reconstructed through the practices of institutions and agencies of the criminal justice 
system (Hillyard et al, 2004). Moreover, such constructions of crime simultaneously 
encompass many petty events and exclude many serious harms. Further, the category of 
‘crime’ gives legitimacy to the expansion of crime control – that is, supports the extension of 
processes which, on any stated rationale for them, do not work, but consistently inflict pain, 
indeed generate social harm. Overall, ‘crime’ serves to maintain power relations and that 
criminology, through its perpetuating of the myth of crime, fuelled all of these processes. 
Importantly, it was further argued that criminology, since its very inception, has enjoyed an 
intimate relationship with the powerful. This relationship is determined largely by its failure 
to analyse adequately the notion of crime – and disciplinary agendas set by this – which has 
been handed down by the state, and around which the criminal justice system has been 
organised. For some involved in this project, a social harm approach was designed as a 
corrective to the limitations of criminology; for others, it was an explicit attempt to develop 
a new discipline, quite separate from criminology, namely ‘zemiology’, with its etymological 
roots in ‘xemia’, the Greek word for harm. 
Since the publication of Hillyard et al’s (2004) edited collection, numerous attempts to engage 
with the approach set out therein have emerged. One stream of work has sought to develop 
and operationalise a harm framework in the context of addressing harms caused by criminal 
justice systems and practices (Greenfield and Paoli, 2013). Others have attempted to develop 
distinct ontological approaches to defining harm, such as Yar’s (2012) framing of social harm 
within theories of recognition, or to develop a general theory of harm via analyses of narrative 
accounts of a diverse range of harming and being harmed (Presser, 2013). Other responses 
have been to dismiss social harm claims as over-introspection, as being clear what is opposed 
rather than what is proposed, or as a redundant since these add nothing to what critical 
criminologists already do. 
Recently, and notably, Pemberton (2015) has sought to refine the defintion of social harm. 
Pemberton (2015, p 9) defines harms ‘as specific events or instances where ‘human 
flourishing’ is demonstrably compromised’, a definition very much rooted within Doyal and 
Gough’s (1991) needs framework. This in turn generates a proposal that these harms can be 
categorised as ‘physical/mental health harms; autonomy harms; relational harms’ 
(Pemberton, 2015, p 9). In terms of the ‘social’, ‘socially mediated’ harms are viewed as 
‘preventable harm’ insofar as they are either ‘foreseeable’ events or the result of ‘alterable’ 
social conditions (Pemberton, 2015, pp 9-10). This leads him to argue that harms are not 
inevitable but are determined by the forms of organisation our societies take. In this way, 
he introduces the notion of ‘capitalist harm’ - harms that are inherent to the capitalist form 
of organisation – and develops a useful typology of harm reduction regimes, which draw 
upon, but supplement, a combination of existing varieties and models of capitalism 
literatures, and groups nation states according to the harm reduction/production features 
they demonstrate.  
A social harm approach is very much a work in progress. There remain key issues with the 
definition of ‘social harm’, its theoretical justification, ontological bases, and its 
operationalisation.  
STEVE TOMBS 
See also: Zemiology 
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